One in three babies in England now has a parent who was born abroad
The
statistics, obtained by Tory MP Nicholas Soames, show that some 131,288
children had two foreign-born parents – 18.1 per cent of the total
number of births in 2011.
A further 12.9 per cent – a total of 93,655 – had one parent who was born outside the UK.
At the end of the year, immigration restrictions will be lifted on
Romanians and Bulgarians – prompting concerns that the numbers will rise
yet further.
Andrew Green, of MigrationWatch, said the figures were ‘astonishing’. He
added: ‘This is the clear result of Labour’s mass immigration policy
which is changing the nature of our society at a speed which is
unacceptable to the public who of course were never consulted.’
The figures – obtained after a parliamentary question – show that 64.9 per cent of babies born in London in 2011 had either one or two parents born outside the UK.
Mixed capital: In London, 64.9 per cent of babies born in 2011 had either one or two parents born abroad
There were 27,403 births where one parent was foreign-born (20.6 per
cent of the total), and 58,905 where both were born abroad (44.3 per
cent).
The next highest percentages were seen in the West Midlands, where 28.7
per cent had at least one foreign parent; the South East, 27.7 per cent;
and the East of England, which covers counties to the north and east of
the capital, 26.9 per cent.
At the other end of the scale, the figure in the North East was 13.1
per cent, and 14 per cent in Wales. In Scotland, it was 18.3 per cent.
Shocking: The figures were obtained by Tory MP Nicholas Soames
David Green, from the centre-right think-tank Civitas, said: ‘The
irresponsible actions of the last government have played havoc with
public services, leading to serious harm especially in the NHS, and
serious harm in the schools system.
‘Maternity units are in crisis, there are huge pressures on school
places, and housing is under even more pressure that it otherwise would
have been.’
A spokesman for the Office for National Statistics said that in 2000,
the proportion of babies in England and Wales born to at least one
foreign-born parent was 21.2 per cent.
It is the first time the figures have been released on both parents.
The ONS usually only releases information on what proportion of mothers
are foreign-born.
Last October, it was revealed that in 2011, there were 808,000 births,
comprised of 612,000 births to UK-born women and 196,000 births to
non-UK born women.
This meant that 24 per cent of births in 2011 were to non-UK born women – an increase of two percentage points since 2007.
The top five non-UK born mothers’ countries by number of births were Poland, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Nigeria.
Not all births are necessarily to parents who live in Britain
permanently, as some could be people who travel to the UK to take
advantage of its free NHS.
Last month, a leading surgeon, Professor Meirion Thomas, said the UK was
becoming the ‘world’s maternity wing’ as people travel here simply to
give birth.
Years of high immigration levels have put intolerable pressure on
maternity units because the number of births has been far higher than
officials had predicted. There is currently a shortage of more than
3,000 midwives in the NHS.
20130707
20130622
Sailing Stones:- Racetrack Playa,Death Valley (Video Included)
Sailing Stones:- Racetrack Playa,Death Valley (Video Included)
The Racetrack playa is 3608 feet (1130 m) above sea level, and
2.8 miles (4.5 km) long (north-south) by 1.3 miles (2 km) wide
(east-west). It is also exceptionally flat and level. Racetrack is dry
for almost the entire year and has no vegetation. When dry, its surface
is covered with small but firm hexagonal mud crack saucers that are
typically 3 to 4 inches (7.5 to 10 cm) in diameter and about an inch
(2.5 cm) thick.

Racetrack Playa from space Sailing stone in Racetrack Playa
Sailing stones, sliding rocks, and moving rocks all refer to a geological phenomenon where rocks move in long tracks along a smooth valley floor without human or animal intervention. They have been studied in a number of places around Racetrack Playa, Death Valley, where the number and length of travel grooves are notable. The force behind their movement is not confirmed and is the subject of research. It really is an Unexplained mystery.

The stones move only every two or three years and most tracks develop over three or four years. Stones with rough bottoms leave straight striated tracks while those with smooth bottoms wander. Stones sometimes turn over, exposing another edge to the ground and leaving a different track in the stone’s wake. Trails differ in both direction and length. Rocks that start next to each other may travel parallel for a time, before one abruptly changes direction to the left, right, or even back the direction it came from. Trail length also varies – two similarly sized and shaped rocks may travel uniformly, then one could move ahead or stop in its track
Learn more about Racetrack Playa in Wikipedia.
Racetrack Playa from space Sailing stone in Racetrack Playa
Sailing stones, sliding rocks, and moving rocks all refer to a geological phenomenon where rocks move in long tracks along a smooth valley floor without human or animal intervention. They have been studied in a number of places around Racetrack Playa, Death Valley, where the number and length of travel grooves are notable. The force behind their movement is not confirmed and is the subject of research. It really is an Unexplained mystery.
The stones move only every two or three years and most tracks develop over three or four years. Stones with rough bottoms leave straight striated tracks while those with smooth bottoms wander. Stones sometimes turn over, exposing another edge to the ground and leaving a different track in the stone’s wake. Trails differ in both direction and length. Rocks that start next to each other may travel parallel for a time, before one abruptly changes direction to the left, right, or even back the direction it came from. Trail length also varies – two similarly sized and shaped rocks may travel uniformly, then one could move ahead or stop in its track
Learn more about Racetrack Playa in Wikipedia.
20130621
Five reasons the euro-optimists are wrong
Five reasons the euro-optimists are wrong
Hope springs eternal in the hearts of the European optimists. Despite the fact that Europe is still mired in its longest post-war economic recession and despite every sign that austerity fatigue now characterizes Europe’s beleaguered periphery, the optimists cling to the hope that an economic recovery is just around the corner and that somehow Europe will muddle through its economic and political crisis.
Sadly this optimism is not well grounded. Rather it rests on a series of myths, which time will tell are no different from the wishful thinking entertained by European policymakers over the past three years.
Myth 1: The European economy is about to recover. Ever since the European debt crisis began in early 2010, optimists have assured us that the economic recovery was just around the corner. Yet that economic recovery has proved to be elusive, especially in the European economic periphery. Delaying that recovery has been the application of severe budget austerity at a time that the troubled European banks have been cutting back on credit. This has all been done within a euro straitjacket that has precluded devaluation as a means to boost exports, which might have served as an offset to highly restrictive domestic demand management policies.
Today the economic policy mix in the European periphery is little different from its immediate past. Although there has been some relaxation in the budget austerity being required of euro members by the European Commission, one still has countries deep in recession being forced to pursue budget austerity within a euro straitjacket. And they are now being required to do so at a time that Europe’s credit crunch persists, the external economic environment has deteriorated, and the euro is now appreciating.
This all begs a question that the European optimists prefer not to ask. If this same sort of economic policy mix deepened Europe’s economic recession in the past, why will it not deepen that recession in the period that lies immediately ahead? And if the European recession does indeed deepen, why will the European banks’ troubles not worsen, and why will Europe’s credit crunch not be more prolonged?
Myth 2: Markets are regaining confidence in Europe. The optimists point to the marked narrowing in European interest rate spreads over the past year as a sure indication that markets are impressed by the improvement in European economic fundamentals. They do so seemingly oblivious to the Wall Street adage that when the winds are strong even turkeys fly. Nor do they seem to pay attention to the fact that those winds have never been stronger considering the unprecedented pace at which the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan have been adding to global liquidity. The question that the optimists do not ask is why once the Fed and the BOJ music stops countries with unsustainable public debt dynamics will not be subject to the market’s full fury as has happened all too often in the past?
Myth 3: The European Central Bank provides a safety net for the euro. The optimists take much comfort in Mario Draghi’s pledge to do whatever it takes to save the euro and in the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program announced last September that was intended to give substance to that pledge. However, they gloss over the fact that the activation of the OMT program for countries like Italy and Spain is very much conditioned upon those countries first negotiating IMF-style economic adjustment programs with the European Stability Mechanism. They also choose to ignore the clearest of signs that the political circumstances of Italy and Spain are such that those countries are progressively losing their willingness to continue with budget austerity and structural reform.
Myth 4: Europe’s economic recession will not undermine its politics. The optimists do not tire of making the point that high as European unemployment rates might be today, Europe need not fear a return to the politics of the 1930s. This blinds them to the substantial erosion that has already occurred over the past two years in the popular support for the established political parties in countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. It also blinds them to the bailout fatigue that is now all too evident in countries like Germany, Finland and the Netherlands. The question that they choose to duck is why a prolonged period of extraordinarily high unemployment in the period ahead will not exacerbate the political tensions already so apparent between Europe’s South and its North.
Myth 5: Everything will change after the German elections. Ever hopeful, the European optimists believe that once the September 2013 German elections is out of the way Germany will throw its full support behind an early move toward a European banking and fiscal union. Little attention do they seem to pay to the fact that all the major German political parties are very mindful to how German taxpayer money might be spent. Even less attention do they seem to pay to the domestic constitutional obstacles or to the visceral opposition of the respected Bundesbank that lie in the way to any such move.
One has to hope that the five myths sustaining the European optimists prove to be well-founded. However, both European and non-European policymakers would be making a big mistake to base their policymaking on such wishful thinking
Hope springs eternal in the hearts of the European optimists. Despite the fact that Europe is still mired in its longest post-war economic recession and despite every sign that austerity fatigue now characterizes Europe’s beleaguered periphery, the optimists cling to the hope that an economic recovery is just around the corner and that somehow Europe will muddle through its economic and political crisis.
Sadly this optimism is not well grounded. Rather it rests on a series of myths, which time will tell are no different from the wishful thinking entertained by European policymakers over the past three years.
Myth 1: The European economy is about to recover. Ever since the European debt crisis began in early 2010, optimists have assured us that the economic recovery was just around the corner. Yet that economic recovery has proved to be elusive, especially in the European economic periphery. Delaying that recovery has been the application of severe budget austerity at a time that the troubled European banks have been cutting back on credit. This has all been done within a euro straitjacket that has precluded devaluation as a means to boost exports, which might have served as an offset to highly restrictive domestic demand management policies.
Today the economic policy mix in the European periphery is little different from its immediate past. Although there has been some relaxation in the budget austerity being required of euro members by the European Commission, one still has countries deep in recession being forced to pursue budget austerity within a euro straitjacket. And they are now being required to do so at a time that Europe’s credit crunch persists, the external economic environment has deteriorated, and the euro is now appreciating.
This all begs a question that the European optimists prefer not to ask. If this same sort of economic policy mix deepened Europe’s economic recession in the past, why will it not deepen that recession in the period that lies immediately ahead? And if the European recession does indeed deepen, why will the European banks’ troubles not worsen, and why will Europe’s credit crunch not be more prolonged?
Myth 2: Markets are regaining confidence in Europe. The optimists point to the marked narrowing in European interest rate spreads over the past year as a sure indication that markets are impressed by the improvement in European economic fundamentals. They do so seemingly oblivious to the Wall Street adage that when the winds are strong even turkeys fly. Nor do they seem to pay attention to the fact that those winds have never been stronger considering the unprecedented pace at which the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan have been adding to global liquidity. The question that the optimists do not ask is why once the Fed and the BOJ music stops countries with unsustainable public debt dynamics will not be subject to the market’s full fury as has happened all too often in the past?
Myth 3: The European Central Bank provides a safety net for the euro. The optimists take much comfort in Mario Draghi’s pledge to do whatever it takes to save the euro and in the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program announced last September that was intended to give substance to that pledge. However, they gloss over the fact that the activation of the OMT program for countries like Italy and Spain is very much conditioned upon those countries first negotiating IMF-style economic adjustment programs with the European Stability Mechanism. They also choose to ignore the clearest of signs that the political circumstances of Italy and Spain are such that those countries are progressively losing their willingness to continue with budget austerity and structural reform.
Myth 4: Europe’s economic recession will not undermine its politics. The optimists do not tire of making the point that high as European unemployment rates might be today, Europe need not fear a return to the politics of the 1930s. This blinds them to the substantial erosion that has already occurred over the past two years in the popular support for the established political parties in countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. It also blinds them to the bailout fatigue that is now all too evident in countries like Germany, Finland and the Netherlands. The question that they choose to duck is why a prolonged period of extraordinarily high unemployment in the period ahead will not exacerbate the political tensions already so apparent between Europe’s South and its North.
Myth 5: Everything will change after the German elections. Ever hopeful, the European optimists believe that once the September 2013 German elections is out of the way Germany will throw its full support behind an early move toward a European banking and fiscal union. Little attention do they seem to pay to the fact that all the major German political parties are very mindful to how German taxpayer money might be spent. Even less attention do they seem to pay to the domestic constitutional obstacles or to the visceral opposition of the respected Bundesbank that lie in the way to any such move.
One has to hope that the five myths sustaining the European optimists prove to be well-founded. However, both European and non-European policymakers would be making a big mistake to base their policymaking on such wishful thinking
20130620
Booze nation - shock alcohol stats
Booze nation - shock alcohol stats
Irish adults drink in a more dangerous way than nearly any other country, according to shock statistics published yesterday.
The report of the Steering Group on National Substance Misuse Strategy reveals that the average Irish adult drank 11.9 litres of pure alcohol in 2010, corresponding to 482 pints of lager, 125 bottles of wine or 45 bottles of vodka per year.
"Given that 19 per cent of the adult population are abstainers, the actual amount of alcohol consumed per drinker is considerably more. While alcohol consumption has reduced since 2000, adults in 2010 were still drinking more than twice the average amount of alcohol consumed per adult in 1960," the report states.
It points out that Ireland's per capita alcohol consumption is 11.3 litres per adult - the tenth highest of 40 countries in 2009. The OECD average is 9.1 litres per adult in 2009.
Irish adults binge drink more than any other European country, with one-quarter of Irish adults reporting that they binge drink every week, the report reveals.
The Steering Group said if every adult (15+ years) restricted his/her alcohol consumption to the recommended maximum low-risk limit on every week of the year, the actual per capita consumption would be 9.2 litres of pure alcohol per adult (15+ years), or 23 per cent less than was consumed in 2010.
Over half of drinkers here have been identified as having a harmful drinking pattern. This equates to nearly 1.5 million adults in Ireland drinking in a harmful pattern.
The report says Irish children are drinking from a younger age and drinking more than ever before - over half of Irish 16 year old children have been drunk and one in five is a weekly drinker.
The average age of first alcohol use in children decreased from 15 years for children born in 1980 to 14 years for children born in 1990, according to the report.
The Steering Group identifies cheap off-licence sales as a contributory factor to alcohol misuse.
It says there was a 161 per cent increase in the number of off-licences operating between 1998 and 2010 and over the same time period the number of pub licences decreased by 19 per cent.
In 2010 the average cost of a 500ml can of lager from the off-licence was €1.77 while the average price of a pint of lager in the on-trade sector was €4.35.
The off-licence sector accounted for half of the alcohol market share in 2008 and, given the much cheaper price of alcohol in the off-licence, the volume of alcohol sold from the off-licence was much greater than that sold in the on-trade, the report reveals.
The Steering Group has proposed measures to curb alcohol misuse, including the phasing out of sponsorship of sporting events by the drinks industry and a 'social responsibility levy' on the drinks industry.
However, Government Ministers appeared to give a lukewarm reception to the report when it was published yesterday. Health Minister James Reilly did not attend the press conference launching the report and Minister for Primary Care Roisin Shortall did not stay to answer questions on its recommendations.
The report shows that the alcohol industry provided an estimated 50,000 jobs in 2008 and the alcohol manufacturing industry had a turnover of €2.95 billion in that year.
Irish adults drink in a more dangerous way than nearly any other country, according to shock statistics published yesterday.
The report of the Steering Group on National Substance Misuse Strategy reveals that the average Irish adult drank 11.9 litres of pure alcohol in 2010, corresponding to 482 pints of lager, 125 bottles of wine or 45 bottles of vodka per year.
"Given that 19 per cent of the adult population are abstainers, the actual amount of alcohol consumed per drinker is considerably more. While alcohol consumption has reduced since 2000, adults in 2010 were still drinking more than twice the average amount of alcohol consumed per adult in 1960," the report states.
It points out that Ireland's per capita alcohol consumption is 11.3 litres per adult - the tenth highest of 40 countries in 2009. The OECD average is 9.1 litres per adult in 2009.
Irish adults binge drink more than any other European country, with one-quarter of Irish adults reporting that they binge drink every week, the report reveals.
The Steering Group said if every adult (15+ years) restricted his/her alcohol consumption to the recommended maximum low-risk limit on every week of the year, the actual per capita consumption would be 9.2 litres of pure alcohol per adult (15+ years), or 23 per cent less than was consumed in 2010.
Over half of drinkers here have been identified as having a harmful drinking pattern. This equates to nearly 1.5 million adults in Ireland drinking in a harmful pattern.
The report says Irish children are drinking from a younger age and drinking more than ever before - over half of Irish 16 year old children have been drunk and one in five is a weekly drinker.
The average age of first alcohol use in children decreased from 15 years for children born in 1980 to 14 years for children born in 1990, according to the report.
The Steering Group identifies cheap off-licence sales as a contributory factor to alcohol misuse.
It says there was a 161 per cent increase in the number of off-licences operating between 1998 and 2010 and over the same time period the number of pub licences decreased by 19 per cent.
In 2010 the average cost of a 500ml can of lager from the off-licence was €1.77 while the average price of a pint of lager in the on-trade sector was €4.35.
The off-licence sector accounted for half of the alcohol market share in 2008 and, given the much cheaper price of alcohol in the off-licence, the volume of alcohol sold from the off-licence was much greater than that sold in the on-trade, the report reveals.
The Steering Group has proposed measures to curb alcohol misuse, including the phasing out of sponsorship of sporting events by the drinks industry and a 'social responsibility levy' on the drinks industry.
However, Government Ministers appeared to give a lukewarm reception to the report when it was published yesterday. Health Minister James Reilly did not attend the press conference launching the report and Minister for Primary Care Roisin Shortall did not stay to answer questions on its recommendations.
The report shows that the alcohol industry provided an estimated 50,000 jobs in 2008 and the alcohol manufacturing industry had a turnover of €2.95 billion in that year.
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