U.S. Banks Bigger Than GDP as Accounting Rift Masks Risk 
That label, like a similar one on automobile side-view mirrors, might be
 required of the four largest U.S. lenders if Thomas Hoenig, vice 
chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., has his way. Applying 
stricter accounting standards for derivatives and off-balance-sheet 
assets would make the banks twice as big as they say they are -- or 
about the size of the U.S. economy -- according to data compiled by 
Bloomberg.
“Derivatives, like loans, carry risk,” Hoenig said in an interview. “To 
recognize those bets on the balance sheet would give a better picture of
 the risk exposures that are there.”
U.S. accounting rules allow banks to record a smaller portion of their 
derivatives than European peers and keep most mortgage-linked bonds off 
their books. That can underestimate the risks firms face and affect how 
much capital they need.
Using international standards for derivatives and consolidating mortgage
 securitizations, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and 
Wells Fargo & Co. would double in assets, while Citigroup Inc. would
 jump 60 percent, third- quarter data show. JPMorgan would swell to $4.5
 trillion from $2.3 trillion, leapfrogging London-based HSBC Holdings 
Plc and Deutsche Bank AG, each with about $2.7 trillion.  
World’s Largest 
JPMorgan, Bank of America and Citigroup would become the world’s three 
largest banks and Wells Fargo the sixth-biggest. Their combined assets 
of $14.7 trillion would equal 93 percent of U.S. gross domestic product 
last year, the data show. Total assets of the country’s banking system 
would be 170 percent of economic output, still lower than 326 percent 
for Germany.
U.S. accounting rules for netting derivatives allow banks to erase about
 $4 trillion in assets, the data show. The lenders also can remove from 
their books most mortgages they package into securities, trimming an 
additional $3 trillion.
Off-balance-sheet assets and derivatives were at the root of the 2008 
financial crisis. Mortgage securitizations kept off the books came back 
to haunt banks forced to repurchase home loans sold to special 
investment vehicles. The government had to rescue American International
 Group Inc. with a bailout that ballooned to $182 billion after the 
insurer couldn’t pay banks on derivatives tied to those bonds.
Derivatives are financial contracts whose value depends on stocks, 
bonds, currencies or other securities. Because two parties agree to swap
 cash or collateral at the end of a pre- determined period, that value 
also depends on the existence of the counterparty when it’s time to pay.  
Netting Derivatives
 
Netting allows banks and trading partners to add up the positions they 
have with each other and show what would be owed if all contracts had to
 be settled suddenly. These master agreements are only relevant during 
bankruptcy and underestimate risk, according to Anat Admati, a finance 
professor at Stanford University. When a bank’s solvency is in doubt, 
derivatives partners demand to be paid immediately, causing a run.
“These liabilities do matter in times of distress,” said Admati, whose 
book “The Bankers’ New Clothes” was published this month. “By netting, 
you are hiding fragilities.”
The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International 
Accounting Standards Board pledged a decade ago to converge the two 
bookkeeping systems. After six years of meetings, they remain divided. 
Proposed rules for how much money banks need to set aside for loan 
losses may make European and U.S. lenders even less comparable.  
‘Can’t Compare’ 
“Having no uniform standard is challenging for issuers and users,” said 
John Hitchins, head of U.K. banking and capital markets at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in London. “Analysts and investors can’t compare 
companies’ financials across borders. Banks have to prepare multiple 
versions of their financial statements in different countries where they
 have units.”
The U.S. accounting board tightened rules on what needs to be 
consolidated in 2009 after the financial crisis, forcing more than $200 
billion of assets onto the balance sheets of the four biggest banks. 
Those included most mortgage bonds not backed by the government. 
Untouched were about $3 trillion of securities guaranteed by U.S.-owned 
housing-finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
While the board agreed with banks that the securities didn’t need to be 
counted because they were insured by the government, risk returned to 
firms that originated the loans after the housing market collapsed. 
Since 2008, the four lenders have faced demands to take back $67 billion
 of mortgages sold to securitizations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. They repurchased a majority of those and settled some disputes 
because the loans hadn’t met agency underwriting standards.  
Covered Bonds
 
European banks sell covered bonds to finance mortgage originations and 
aren’t allowed under international accounting rules to move the home 
loans that back them off their balance sheets. Covered bonds package 
mortgages like securitizations, and the bonds are sold to investors. In 
case of bankruptcy, the mortgages that back the covered bonds are walled
 off from other assets of the bank and can be seized by bondholders.
Buyers of the bonds can demand that banks replace soured mortgages with 
performing ones, leaving the credit risk with the originator. That’s 
similar to buyback requests in the U.S. Executives at U.S. banks 
disagree, saying the securitizations pass mortgage-default risk to the 
government and investors, while covered bonds don’t.
During the crisis, European nations bailed out dozens of banks to 
prevent the collapse of the covered-bond market. That’s similar to the 
rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. and shows how both 
mortgage markets are government-backed, said Hans-Joachim Duebel, 
founder of Finpolconsult, a Berlin-based housing-finance consulting 
firm.  
Capital Rules
 
“Covered bonds are not that different from the Fannie- Freddie 
securitization mechanism,” Duebel said. “U.S. banks are just as liable 
for what they originate and sell to the agencies as Europeans are for 
what’s in their covered bonds.”
Canadian banks, which use international standards, aren’t allowed to 
move mortgages off their balance sheets, even though about 75 percent 
are insured by the government.
What goes on balance sheets and what’s kept off affect how much capital banks are required to have.
Capital rules are intended to limit how much borrowed money banks can 
use in relation to shareholder equity. The higher the ratio, the greater
 the probability firms will have enough capital to cover losses and stay
 out of bankruptcy.  
JPMorgan, Citigroup
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which sets global standards,
 traditionally has based capital rules on risk- weighted assets rather 
than raw balance-sheet size. A simpler ratio introduced in 2010 as an 
additional measure to rein in risk-taking would be based on total 
assets.
U.S. banks have been complying with a domestic version of that ratio for
 the past two decades. It requires U.S. lenders to have capital equal to
 4 percent of total assets as determined by U.S. accounting standards. 
Under that definition, JPMorgan and Citigroup, both based in New York, 
and Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America had capital ratios 
of about 7 percent, while Wells Fargo’s was 9.4 percent as of Sept. 30, 
the most recent period for which data are available.
If the banks used international standards for derivatives and 
consolidated mortgage securitizations, the ratio for JPMorgan and Bank 
of America, the two largest U.S. lenders, would fall below 4 percent. It
 would be just above 4 percent for Citigroup and Wells Fargo.
That would make the biggest U.S. banks look no better capitalized, or 
worse, than European peers such as HSBC at 5.6 percent or France’s BNP 
Paribas SA at 3.9 percent at the end of last year. It also could require
 them to raise more capital. Spokesmen for all four banks declined to 
comment.  
Accounting Differences
 
The accounting differences colored the debate in Basel when a similar 
ratio was introduced. U.S. regulators on the committee, which includes 
banking supervisors from 27 nations, at first proposed adopting 
international rules for netting derivatives when calculating the simpler
 capital standard, also called a leverage ratio.
European regulators would only agree if the ratio were set no higher 
than 1 percent, according to former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, who 
participated in the talks. Instead, the committee opted to use U.S. 
accounting rules for netting derivatives and set the limit at 3 percent.
A 3 percent ratio means that a bank needs $3 of capital for every $100 
of assets. For the more traditional Basel capital measure, the same $3 
would result in a higher ratio because some of the assets are discounted
 by the smaller amount of risks they are assumed to carry.
“The U.S. leverage ratio doesn’t capture off-balance-sheet risks,” said 
Bair, now chairman of the Systemic Risk Council, a private regulatory 
watchdog. “Once U.S. banks start publishing the new Basel-mandated 
ratios, more off-balance-sheet assets will become obvious.”  
EU Balking
 
Bair said she favors raising the simple capital ratio as high as 8 
percent. Hoenig, the FDIC vice chairman, has called for 10 percent. U.S.
 regulators are still debating how to implement the rules. Because Basel
 isn’t an international treaty, each country needs to adopt its own 
version.
Still, the European Union is balking at implementing the capital rule 
based on total assets. It’s considering delaying when EU banks have to 
begin reporting the ratio using the methodology and hasn’t decided 
whether to make it binding.
The first Basel rules were agreed to in 1988 in an effort to converge 
global banking regulations. Fourteen years later, U.S. and international
 rule-setters signed what is known as the Norwalk agreement, named after
 the Connecticut town where the U.S. accounting board is based, pledging
 to work together to “make their existing financial reporting standards 
fully compatible as soon as is practicable.”  
Common Standards
 
Behind the initial push were David Tweedie, the first chairman of the 
International Accounting Standards Board; Harvey Pitt, who headed the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at the time; and Paul Volcker, 
the former Federal Reserve chairman instrumental in the group’s 
formation.
Progress on common standards slowed after Mary Schapiro became SEC 
chairman in 2009 and faced lobbying by companies opposed to what they 
said would be costly accounting changes, according to four people with 
knowledge of the discussions who asked not to be identified because the 
talks were private.
“I’ve always supported working toward convergence, and we pushed FASB 
and IASB hard to reach satisfactory agreements,” Schapiro, who left the 
SEC in December, said in an interview. “But I wasn’t keen on dropping 
the U.S. accounting standard and adopting the international one before 
those differences were significantly narrowed.”  
Financial Footnotes
 
In 2011, the U.S. accounting board came close to moving in Europe’s 
direction on derivatives netting. There was pushback from the largest 
U.S. banks, according to a person familiar with the talks. Lenders 
argued that gross values overstate actual positions because parties 
often make opposite bets rather than tear up existing contracts. The 
board dropped the plan.
Tweedie, a former chairman of the U.K.’s accounting board, failed to win
 the support of France and Germany for convergence, according to the 
people familiar with those discussions. While European banks have long 
favored the U.S. approach to netting derivatives, they haven’t pushed 
for change because it wouldn’t have an impact on income statements or 
capital requirements, which are based on risk-weighting of assets, 
according to Andrew Spooner, a London-based partner at Deloitte LLP.
“When it’s about the size of the balance sheet only, and not a profit-loss issue, it’s not as crucial for firms,” Spooner said.  
Fannie, Freddie
 
New disclosure requirements for U.S. and European banks on how they net 
derivatives that take effect this year will make comparisons easier, 
Spooner said. The biggest U.S. banks already are reporting more details 
in the footnotes of quarterly financial statements, making it possible 
to calculate their derivatives assets under international standards.
There isn’t as much uniformity in disclosures of off- balance-sheet 
assets. JPMorgan’s securitizations of home loans backed by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were estimated by using the figure for mortgages the 
bank services and the average ratio of servicing to off-balance-sheet 
assets at other lenders.
U.S. rule-setters have done more than their international counterparts 
to force banks to consolidate securitization vehicles. Still, there was 
little debate about whether lenders should include loans sold to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.
Before the financial crisis, the government-backed firms didn’t include 
mortgage bonds created from those loans on their balance sheets either. 
After collapsing under the weight of losses and being taken over by the 
government, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac started consolidating the 
securities. They also tried to recover losses from banks that sold them 
badly underwritten home loans.  
Control Mechanisms
 
Lenders have said improved control mechanisms for loans they originate 
and transfer to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for packaging into mortgage 
bonds obviate the need to consolidate or set aside reserves for future 
repurchases. That optimism isn’t shared by Esther Mills, president of 
Accounting Policy Plus, a New York-based consulting firm.
“There was clearly a failure by certain institutions to appropriately 
assess the liabilities before the crisis,” said Mills, a former Morgan 
Stanley and Merrill Lynch & Co. accounting executive. “Are there 
enough liabilities going forward for the billions of mortgages being 
transferred?”
In the first nine months of last year, San Francisco-based Wells Fargo 
transferred $398 billion of mortgages to residential-mortgage 
securitizations guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The bank 
recorded a $209 million liability for “probable repurchase losses,” 
according to its latest quarterly filing. It has faced more than $12 
billion of buyback demands from the government-backed firms for crisis 
loans.  
‘Dangerous Things’
 
“There are probably some dangerous things left off the balance sheet 
still, and we’ll only find out what in the next crisis,” said David 
Sherman, an accounting professor at Northeastern University in Boston. 
“But how many times do we have to go through this to figure it all out?”
After failing to agree on common standards for derivatives netting and 
consolidation of securitizations, rule-setters are now heading in 
different directions as they debate how to account for loan-loss 
reserves.
The U.S. accounting board proposed after the financial crisis that banks
 mark all loans and debt securities to market values, not just those 
held short-term. The board abandoned the plan after lobbying by banks, 
which would have had to recognize losses, according to a person familiar
 with the deliberations.  
No Convergence
 
A new U.S. proposal that would require banks to record expected losses 
over the lifetime of a loan has met with similar opposition. The plan 
would force lenders to set aside higher reserves upfront, leading to 
lower profits than European peers, Sherman estimates.
Under current accounting rules on both sides of the Atlantic, only 
incurred losses need to be reported. The international board is 
considering a change that would require banks to reserve for losses 
expected over a 12-month period.
While both the U.S. and international proposals probably would result in
 higher loan-loss reserves, they might not prevent lenders from being 
too late recognizing losses, as they were in the past, according to 
Jamie Mayer, a bank-accounting analyst at Grant Thornton LLP in Chicago.
“If their risk models don’t show any problems, and they didn’t before 
2008, it’s unclear how solely changing the accounting would solve 
concerns,” Mayer said in an interview.
In a January survey of 70 banks around the world conducted by auditing 
firm Deloitte, 88 percent of respondents said they don’t expect 
convergence on accounting rules most relevant to lenders, including 
derivatives, balance-sheet consolidation and how to reserve for loan 
losses.
Leslie Seidman, chairman of the U.S. accounting board, and Hans 
Hoogervorst, head of the international panel, both said at a conference 
in New York last month that they hadn’t given up.
“I still hope for one standard,” Hoogervorst said. “But at times it’s easy to be discouraged.”