Spain is officially insolvent: get your money out while you still can
I'd not noticed this until someone drew my attention to it, but the
latest IMF Fiscal Monitor, published last month, comes about as close to
declaring Spain insolvent as you are ever likely to see in official
analysis of this sort. Of course, it doesn't actually say this outright.
The IMF is far too diplomatic for such language. But that's the plain
meaning of its latest forecasts, which at last have an air of realism
about them, rather than being the usual dose of wishful thinking.
Let's take the projected budget deficit first. This is expected to
decline quite steeply this year to 6.6 per cent of GDP, but that's
mainly because the cost of bailing out the banking sector fell
substantially on last year's budget. On a like-for-like basis, there has
in fact been very little fall in the underlying deficit. And nor on the
present policy mix is there ever likely to be, for that's where the
deficit is projected to remain until the end of the IMF's forecasting
horizon in 2018.
Next year, the deficit is expected to be 6.9 per cent, the year after
6.6 per cent, and so on with very little further progress thereafter.
Remember, all these projections are made on the basis of everything we
know about policy so far, so they take account of the latest package of
austerity measures announced by the Spanish Government.
The situation looks even worse on a cyclically adjusted basis. What is
sometimes called the "structural deficit", or the bit of government
borrowing that doesn't go away even after the economy returns to growth
(if indeed it ever does), actually deteriorates from an expected 4.2 per
cent of GDP this year to 5.7 per cent in 2018. By 2018, Spain has far
and away the worst structural deficit of any advanced economy, including
other such well known fiscal basket cases as the UK and the US.
So what happens when you carry on borrowing at that sort of rate, year
in, year out? Your overall indebtedness rockets, of course, and that's
what's going to happen to Spain, where general government gross debt is
forecast to rise from 84.1 per cent of GDP last year to 110.6 per cent
in 2018. No other advanced economy has such a dramatically worsening
outlook. And the tragedy of it all is that Spain is actually making
relatively good progress in addressing the "primary balance", that's the
deficit before debt servicing costs.
What's projected to occur is essentially what happens in all
bankruptcies. Eventually you have to borrow more just to pay the
interest on your existing debt. The fiscal compact requires eurozone
countries to reduce their deficits to 3 per cent by the end of this
year, though Spain among others was recently granted an extension. But
on these numbers, there is no chance ever of achieving this target
without further austerity measures, which even if they were attempted
would very likely be self defeating. IN any case, it seems doubtful an
economy where unemployment is already above 25 per cent could take any
more.
In the past, the IMF has been guilty of being far too optimistic about
Spain, both on the outlook for growth and the public finances, so it's
possible it is now committing the reverse mistake of undue pessimism.
Yet somehow I doubt it. Spain is chasing its tail down into deflationary
oblivion.
All this leads to the conclusion that a big Spanish debt restructuring
is inevitable. Spanish sovereign bond yields have fallen sharply since
announcement of the European Central Bank's "outright monetary
transactions" programme. The ECB has promised to print money without
limit to counter the speculators. But in the end, no amount of liquidity
can cover up for an underlying problem with solvency.
Europe said that Greece was the first and last such restructuring, but
then there was Cyprus. Spain is holding off further recapitalisation of
its banks in anticipation of the arrival of Europe's banking union,
which it hopes will do the job instead. But if the Cypriot precedent is
anything to go by, a heavy price will be demanded by way of recompense.
Bank creditors will be widely bailed in. Confiscation of deposits looks
all too possible.
I don't advise getting your money out lightly. Indeed, such advise is
generally thought grossly irresponsible, for it risks inducing a self
reinforcing panic. Yet looking at the IMF projections, it's the only
rational thing to do.
PS. I don't include creditors of the British arm of Santander in this
warning, who are ring fenced from the mothership back bome in Spain,
theoretically at least.
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